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Likelihood of Infectious Outcomes Following Infectious Risk
Moments During Patient Care—An International Expert Consensus
Study and Quantitative Risk Index
Lauren Clack, MSc;1 Simone Passerini, BScN;1 Tanja Manser, PhD;2,a Hugo Sax, MD1,a
objective. To elicit expert consensus on the likelihood of infectious outcomes (patient colonization or infection) following a broad range
of infectious risk moments (IRMs) from observations in acute care.
design. Expert consensus study using modiﬁed Delphi technique.
participants. Panel of 40 international experts including nurses, physicians and microbiologists specialized in infectious diseases and
infection prevention and control (IPC).
methods. The modiﬁed Delphi process consisted of 3 online survey rounds, with feedback of mean ratings and expert comments between
rounds. The Delphi survey comprised 52 care scenarios representing observed IRMs organized into 6 sections: hands, gloves, medical devices,
mobile objects, invasive procedures, and additional moments. For each scenario, experts indicated the likelihood of both patient colonization
and infection on a scale from 0 to 5 (high). Expert ratings were plotted against frequencies of IRMs observed during actual patient care resulting
in a risk index.
results. Following 3 rounds, consensus was achieved for 92 of 104 items (88.5%). The mean ratings across all scenarios for likelihood of
colonization and infection were 2.68 and 2.02, respectively. The likelihood of colonization was rated higher than infection for 48 of 52 scenarios.
Ratings were signiﬁcantly higher for colonization (P= .001) and infection (P< .0005) when the scenario involved transfer of pathogens to
critical patient sites.
conclusions. The design of effective IPC strategies requires the selection of behaviors according to their impact on patient outcomes. The
IRM index reported here provides a basis for standardizing and prioritizing targets for quality improvement initiatives, training, and future
research in acute health care.
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2018;39:280–289
Healthcare-associated infections (HAI) affect hundreds of
millions of patients every year worldwide, resulting in
prolonged length of hospital stay, long-term disability, high
costs to patients and health systems, and excess deaths.1,2 The
causes of such infections are multifactorial. Transmission of
microorganisms from a reservoir to a susceptible host plays an
important part, as well as interventions that disrupt patients’
natural defenses. Within the healthcare setting, potential
reservoirs include the preexisting ﬂora of patients themselves,
healthcare workers (HCWs), or the physical environment.3,4
Contact transmission,3 whereby microorganisms are trans-
mitted directly from an infected person or indirectly via a
contaminated intermediate object (eg, mobile objects, medical
devices5,6) or a person carrying transient ﬂora,7,8 has been
cited as the most common means of transferring pathogens
that may result in patient colonization and infection.9 A recent
study found that infectious risk moments (IRMs), deﬁned as
seemingly innocuous yet frequently occurring care manipula-
tions resulting in the potential transfer of pathogens to a
patient, occur an average of 42.8 times per active patient care
hour and 34.9, 36.8, and 56.3 times per hour in the intensive
care, medical, and emergency wards, respectively.10 These
ﬁndings suggest that the cumulative risk of negative patient
outcomes due to IRM may be signiﬁcant.
Despite growing interest to understand the role of pathogen
transmission in healthcare settings, microbiological studies
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quantifying the risks associated with speciﬁc behaviors, such
as IRMs,11 are limited.12,13 This deﬁciency is perhaps due to
the complexity and costs associated with the extensive envir-
onmental sampling that would be required to draw the link
between behaviors and transmission dynamics. This lack of
microbiological evidence likely introduces ambiguity regard-
ing the infectious risks present during clinical care and this
ambiguity may present a barrier to safe clinician behavior.
We sought expert consensus from the ﬁelds of infectious
diseases, infection prevention and control (IPC), and micro-
biology regarding the likelihood of infectious outcomes in a
series of typical care scenarios that were observed during acute
care. This companion article, reported in this same issue,
describes the results of structured observations to identify the
frequency and nature of IRM in acute-care settings.10
We aimed to establish a comprehensive inventory of IRMs
together with expert evaluations of clinical relevance. This
inventory will serve the community of researchers and prac-
titioners as a basis for designing and prioritizing future patient
safety research, training, and quality improvement initiatives
for infection prevention and control.
methods
A modiﬁed Delphi technique14 was used to elicit expert
opinion on the likelihood of infectious outcomes (ie, patient
colonization or infection) following IRMs. Experts were invi-
ted to participate in a Delphi process for an anticipated 3
rounds, or until consensus was achieved, whichever occurred
ﬁrst. The Delphi process was conducted in an iterative nature
with subsequent rounds informed by a feedback summary of
group response in the previous round whereby experts could
reassess their initial responses. Surveys were distributed elec-
tronically using an online tool, allowing participates to remain
anonymous and minimize conformity.14 The Cantonal Ethics
Committee of Zurich formally waived the ethics requirement
for this study (KEK-StV-Nr.73/14).
Participants
We recruited a panel of international experts (nurses, physi-
cians, and microbiologists) specialized in infectious diseases
and IPC to represent a broad range of knowledge in the topic
of germ transmission. We initially sent an invitation to 59
potential participants explaining the scope of the project and
asking that they commit to all rounds of the Delphi process.
Individuals who agreed to participate were included in the
expert panel.
Survey Design
The survey consisted of 52 care scenarios that included a
sample IRM observed during 130 hours of exploratory obser-
vations.10 Each IRM may be represented as a 3-part trans-
mission pathway that identiﬁes the surfaces (ie, source, vector,
and endpoint) involved in the potential transmission
of pathogens to the patient. Care scenarios were therefore
selected to represent the range of observed transmission
pathways based on (1) the source of pathogens, (2) the vector
of transmission, and (3) the patient site (endpoint) to
which the pathogens may be transferred, according to the
INFORM (INFectiOus Risk Moment) structured classiﬁcation
taxonomy.10 We distinguished between endpoints that were
noncritical sites (eg, intact skin, intact dressings, patient
clothing), critical sites, deﬁned as “body sites or medical devi-
ces that have to be protected against microorganisms poten-
tially leading to patient infection”15 (eg, mucous membranes,
catheter insertion sites, open wounds), and patient bedding.
The INFORM taxonomy excludes transmission pathways that
do not end with the patient or patient bed.
The survey included 6 thematic sections based on the
vectors involved: HCW hands, gloves, HCW clothing or
accessories, invasive devices, medical devices, and mobile
objects. The order in which the scenarios were presented
within each section were block-randomized to avoid order-
effect biases.16 The survey included 55 questions, 3 of which
did not include scenarios meeting the current deﬁnition of
IRM and are not included in this report. For each scenario,
experts used a Likert-type scale to indicate the likelihood of
patient colonization and patient infection, resulting in ratings
for 104 items. Experts rated likelihood using the following
scale: 0, none; 1, very low; 2, low; 3, medium; 4, high; or 5, very
high. For all scenarios, experts were instructed to make an
assessment based on an archetypical ICU patient in an 800-bed
academic hospital, for which a description was provided in the
survey instructions. A shortened version of the survey has
previously been pilot tested.11 Results from the pilot survey are
not included in the current manuscript.
Delphi Procedure
For each Delphi round, experts received personalized access to
the online survey and were instructed to complete the survey
within 3 weeks. Personalized reminders were sent to all experts
with partial or missing responses, 2 and 4 weeks after each
initial invitation.
Round 1. Experts received access to the structured survey
with all care scenarios and were instructed to judge the
likelihood of (1) patient colonization and (2) patient infection
for each scenario. Experts were given the opportunity to
provide comments along with their ratings.
Round 2. Experts received access to the structured survey
with all care scenarios, as well as a summary of round 1 results,
that is, the mean ratings for likelihood of colonization and
infection for each care scenario. Experts were instructed to
revise their judgements or to use the comments section to
specify their rational for diverging from the mean ratings.
Round 3. Experts received the structured survey including
only care scenarios for which consensus had not been
achieved, to reduce workload, as well as a feedback summary
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of round 2 results, that is, the mean ratings for likelihood of
colonization and infection and the expert comments for each
scenario. Experts were instructed that this was likely the ﬁnal
opportunity to revise their ratings and were encouraged to
provide comments explaining their ratings.
Statistical Analysis
Consensus was deﬁned a priori as 80% of participant votes
falling within 2 consecutive points on a 6-point scale.17
Statistical analyses, including measures of central tendency
(means, medians, and mode), and comparison of means, were
conducted using STATA version 14.2 software (StataCorp,
College Station, TX) and SPSS version 23 software (IBM,
Armonk, NY).
For interpretation of results, we propose a quantitative risk
assessment based on Delphi expert ratings together with
frequencies of IRM observed in an actual ICU.10 Each scenario
from the Delphi survey was classiﬁed using the INFORM
taxonomy according to the source, vector, and endpoint
involved in the portrayed IRM. The frequencies during actual
patient care of IRMwith the same source, vector, and endpoint
were extracted from Clack et al10 and plotted against expert
consensus ratings. By multiplying expert ratings (likelihood of
colonization and likelihood of infection) for each IRM by the
frequency with which that category of IRM was observed
during actual care in the ICU (number of active care hours),
we established a quantitative indication of the relative risk
represented by each individual IRM, which we term the
IRM index.
results
Following our invitation, 40 experts responded positively and
formed our expert panel. The expert panel included physicians
(n= 30, 75%), nurses (n= 71, 7.5%), and microbiologists
(n= 3, 7.5%), with primary specialization in infection
prevention (n= 22, 55%), microbiology (n= 10, 25%), and
infectious diseases (n= 8, 20%). These participants repre-
sented the following geographic regions: Europe (n= 27,
67.5%); the Americas (n= 8, 20%); and the Western Paciﬁc
(n= 5, 12.5%). The participation rates, despite 2 reminders in
Delphi rounds 1, 2, and 3, were 92.5% (physicians 87%, nurses
86%, microbiologists 100%), 87.5% (physicians 80%, nurses
86%, microbiologists 100%), and 75% (physicians 70%,
nurses 86%, microbiologists 100%) (Figure 1).
Following 3 Delphi rounds, consensus was achieved for 92
of 104 items (88.5%). Items for which consensus was not
achieved concerned 9 colonization ratings, and 3 infection
ratings and fell under the categories of invasive (n= 6) and
medical devices (n= 2), mobile objects (n= 2), HCWs (n= 1),
and HCWhands (n= 1). We included all consensus ratings (or
Delphi round 3 ratings when the prior were unavailable) as our
ﬁnal ratings for the analysis (Table 1). These experts did not
conclude that any of the 52 scenarios represented no likelihood
of colonization or infection. Expert ratings from all 3 rounds
are reported in Appendix 1.
The mean ﬁnal ratings across all scenarios for likelihood of
colonization and infection were 2.68 (95% CI, 1.73–2.02) and
2.02 (95% CI, 0.97–3.24) (Table 1). The ﬁnal ratings for like-
lihood of colonization were higher than infection in 48 of 52
scenarios. The 4 remaining scenarios concerned moments of
potential pathogen transfer to critical sites. A Wilcoxon
signed-rank test determined that the increase in ratings for
likelihood of colonization compared to likelihood of infection
was statistically signiﬁcant (z= 5.92; P< .0005). Furthermore,
the mean ratings across all IRM scenarios concerning potential
transfer of pathogens to critical patient sites, 2.88 for coloni-
zation and 2.51 for infection, were signiﬁcantly higher than for
moments concerning potential transfer of pathogens to
noncritical patient sites: 2.39 for colonization (P= .001) and
1.31 for infection (P< .0005). The mean ratings for likelihood
of colonization and infection were grouped according to
transmission vector: hands (colonization, 3.02; infection,
2.19), gloves (colonization, 2.63; infection, 2.09), HCW
clothing or accessories (colonization, 2.42; infection, 1.36),
invasive devices (colonization, 2.75; infection, 2.51), medical
devices (colonization, 2.46; infection, 1.32), and mobile
objects (colonization, 2.47; infection, 1.69). The mean ratings
ﬁgure 1. Flow chart demonstrating the participation rate of
invited experts.
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table 1. Expert Consensus Ratings Grouped by Vectora
ID No. Scenario
Colonization
Likelihoodb
Infection
Likelihoodb Source Endpoint
Invasive device, mean 2.75 2.51
44 An HCW touches the insertion site (already disinfected) of thoracic tubes with nonsterile gloves that had
already been worn for an extended period, touching multiple surfaces, and adjusts the position of the
tubes.
3.45 3.06 Gloves Critical site
46 Just before inserting a peripheral venous catheter (PVC), the needle comes into contact with nonsterile
disposable examination gloves.
2.70 2.88 Gloves Critical site
29 A 3-way valve IV line (connected to an IV line) is left open (uncapped) on a patient’s bed. 2.83 2.73 Environment Patient bed
42 Disinfected skin is touched several times with nonsterile gloves (to locate anatomic structures), before
inserting a central venous catheter.
2.94 2.73 Patient intact skin Critical site
47 While inserting a peripheral venous catheter, the same needle is retracted and reinserted several times at
slightly different skin sites in search of the vein.
2.45 2.70 Patient intact skin Critical site
41 An HCW draws blood from a vein in a patient’s foot, which is visibly soiled, without prior skin
disinfection.
2.13 2.63 Patient intact skin Critical site
49 An HCW wearing blood-stained, nonsterile disposable examination gloves manipulates a 3-way hub of
a patient’s central vascular line. (Blood is from the same patient.)
2.80 2.63 Gloves Critical site
43 Prior to inserting a peripheral line, an HCW uses her bare hands (that had not been immediately
disinfected) to palpate the patient’s vein after the insertion site had already been disinfected.
2.67 2.61 Patient intact skin Critical site
45 A urinary catheter tip is touched with nonsterile disposable examination gloves prior to inserting a urinary
catheter.
2.97 2.53 Gloves Critical site
50 An HCW prepares to replace a mechanical ventilation tube ﬁlter. The HCW opens the new sterile ﬁlter
with nonsterile disposable examination gloves, places the new ﬁlter on the patient’s bed, removes the old
ﬁlter, then picks up the new ﬁlter from the bed and attaches it to the ventilation tube.
2.97 2.45 Environment Critical site
30 A three-way valve is placed on a Moltex absorbent sheet (Fisher Scientiﬁc) on a patient’s bed. An open
lumen of the 3-way valve touches the Moltex sheet. The 3-way valve is then used for an IV line.
2.70 2.39 Mobile object Critical site
26 An HCW disconnects a patient’s tracheal tube, places the tube on nonsterile patient bedding, then
reconnects the tube again.
2.94 2.30 Environment Critical site
27 The tube connected to a patient’s urinary catheter lies on ﬂoor, then the HCWplaces it on the patient’s bed. 2.64 2.07 Environment Patient bed
28 An HCW places a used suction catheter (used for suctioning of a mechanical ventilation) on the patient’s
bed (same patient).
2.30 1.45 Patient critical site Patient bed
Hands, mean 3.02 2.19
6 An HCW cleans a toilet, touching toilet brush handle with bare hands then, without hand hygiene, touches
a patient’s open wound.
3.80 3.24 Mobile object Critical site
2 After caring for a ﬁrst patient, an HCW touches another patient’s open wound without hand hygiene. 3.76 3.20 Other patient Critical site
4 An HCW touches her private mobile phone then, without hand hygiene, touches a patient’s open wound. 3.24 2.73 Mobile object Critical site
10 After touching parts of her own body and her immediate environment (bedside table, phone, and bed
linens), a patient touches her own open wound.
3.17 2.70 Environment Critical site
9 After touching multiple surfaces in the healthcare environment, a HCW enters a patient’s room then,
without hand hygiene, prepares and administers intravenous medication.
2.93 2.33 Environment Critical site
8 An HCW touches his face and hair then changes an infusion, without hand hygiene. 2.76 2.21 Healthcare
worker
Critical site
7 An HCW touches the paper patient records then, without hand hygiene, changes an infusion. 2.48 1.91 Environment Critical site
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table 1. Continued
ID No. Scenario
Colonization
Likelihoodb
Infection
Likelihoodb Source Endpoint
5 An HCW cleans a toilet, touching toilet brush handle with bare hands then, without hand hygiene, touches
patient intact skin.
3.18 1.36 Mobile object Noncritical site
1 After caring for a ﬁrst patient, an HCW shakes another patient’s hand without hand hygiene. 2.53 1.18 Other patient Noncritical site
3 An HCW touches her private mobile phone then, without hand hygiene, touches patient intact skin. 2.30 1.06 Mobile object Noncritical site
Gloves, mean 2.63 2.09
14 An HCW wearing gloves disposes of a used vomiting bag then inserts a venous cannula while wearing the
same pair of gloves.
3.52 3.13 Mobile object Critical site
18 An HCW programs an infusion pump (touch screen) while wearing gloves that had already been worn for
an extended period of time, touching multiple surfaces in the room, then manually veriﬁes a central
venous catheter insertion site while still wearing the same gloves.
3.30 2.83 Medical device Critical site
17 An HCW disposes of gloves following intimate care, and does not perform hand hygiene prior to
continuing patient care and touching patient’s open wound.
3.09 2.63 Patient critical site Critical site
19 An HCW programs an infusion pump while wearing gloves that had already been worn for an extended
period of time, touching multiple surfaces in the room, then manually veriﬁes a peripheral catheter
insertion site while still wearing the same gloves.
3.18 2.58 Medical device Critical site
15 An HCW performs hand hygiene, dons gloves, then examines a patient with open wounds moving from
wounds to intact skin and back, wearing the same gloves for the entire examination.
2.67 2.27 Patient intact skin Critical site
12 After having touched several surfaces in the healthcare environment, an HCW enters a patient room then,
without hand hygiene, pulls gloves out of the box and dons the gloves then touches patient’s open
wound
2.45 2.06 Environment Critical site
13 After having touched several surfaces in the healthcare environment, an HCW enters a patient room, then,
without hand hygiene, carefully and correctly dons sterile surgical gloves without previous hand hygiene
then proceeds to insert a central venous line.
1.77 1.73 Environment Critical site
20 An HCW providing intimate care silences an alarm on the patient bedside monitor touchscreen, then
continues with intimate care, all with the same pair of gloves.
2.27 1.33 Medical device Critical site
11 After having touched several surfaces in the healthcare environment, an HCW enters a patient room then,
without hand hygiene, pulls (nonsterile) gloves out of the box and dons the gloves then touches patient’s
intact skin.
1.80 1.21 Environment Noncritical site
16 An HCW disposes of gloves following intimate care, and does not perform hand hygiene prior to
continuing patient care and touching patient’s intact skin.
2.21 1.12 Patient critical site Noncritical site
Mobile object, mean 2.47 1.69
38 A transfer cannula (plastic piercing spike with ﬁnger plate used to mix solutions and medications) is placed
on a worktop for temporary storage, and is then used again for preparing the next medication.
2.70 2.91 Environment Critical site
48 An open wound is not completely covered by the wound dressing and consequently comes into contact
with bed linens.
3.18 2.70 Environment Critical site
37 An HCW places a bag of gastric secretions on an intubated and sedated patient’s face. 2.67 1.83 Unknown status Noncritical site
36 Medical-grade adhesive tape is attached to bedrails prior to being used to secure a peripheral line onto the
patient’s skin.
2.58 1.67 Environment Noncritical site
40 During intimate care, the washcloth being used to clean the patient falls to the ﬂoor. The HCW picks it up
and continues using it to provide intimate care.
2.67 1.45 Environment Critical site
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33 A purpose-built board to facilitate the transfer of patients from a stretcher to a bed (or vice versa) is used on
2 consecutive patients without disinfection between uses.
2.64 1.33 Other patient Noncritical site
32 A tourniquet is used to draw blood of 2 consecutive patients without being disinfected between uses. 2.00 1.21 Other patient Noncritical site
35 An HCW’s professional mobile phone, attached to her belt, comes into contact with patient skin during
patient examination.
2.03 1.09 Other patient Noncritical site
39 A patient’s duvet falls on the ﬂoor. An HCW picks up the duvet and puts it back on the patient. 1.73 1.06 Environment Noncritical site
HCW clothing or accessories, mean 2.42 1.36
51 An HCWwearing long-sleeved private clothing attends to several patients consecutively. The sleeves of his
private clothing come into contact with several patients.
2.30 1.45 Other patient Noncritical site
52 An HCW wearing a long-sleeved white coat attends to several patients consecutively. The sleeves of his
white coat come into contact with several patients.
2.64 1.36 Other patient Noncritical site
34 An HCW’s wristwatch comes into contact with the skin of multiple consecutive patients during patient
examination.
2.33 1.27 Other patient Noncritical site
Medical device, mean 2.46 1.32
24 An x-ray plate with direct contact with patient skin is used on a patient under contact isolation for
colonization with gram-negative multidrug-resistant Klebsiella pneumophila, then used on a subsequent
patient, without being disinfected between uses.
3.27 1.80 Other patient Noncritical site
31 A stethoscope is used on 2 consecutive patients without being disinfected between uses. 2.07 1.42 Other patient Noncritical site
23 The electrode multi-use suction cups of an ECG device fall on the ﬂoor and then are used on a patient
without being disinfected.
2.10 1.27 Environment Noncritical site
21 An x-ray plate with direct contact with patient skin is used on 2 consecutive patients without being
disinfected between uses.
2.67 1.24 Other patient Noncritical site
22 An ECG device including the electrode with multi-use suction cups is used on 2 consecutive patients
without being disinfected between uses.
2.55 1.24 Other patient Noncritical site
25 A blood pressure cuff is used on 2 consecutive patients without being disinfected between uses. 2.10 0.97 Other patient Noncritical site
NOTE. HCW, healthcare worker.
aExpert consensus ratings are based on a Likert-type scale from 0 (none) to 5 (very high), grouped according to the vector involved in potential pathogen transfer. Groups are sorted in
descending order of mean likelihood of infection. Questions within groups are sorted by descending likelihood of infection.
bRatings for which consensus was achieved are indicated in boldface type.
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according to source, vector, and endpoint are shown in
Figure 2.
The expert ratings for likelihood of colonization and
infection are plotted against frequency data extracted from
Clack et al10 in Figure 3. The resulting relative risk indices,
based on the multiplication of expert ratings and frequency
of occurrence during structured observations in an ICU, are
shown in Figure 4.
discussion
This modiﬁed Delphi expert consensus study revealed
low-medium mean ratings for the likelihood of infectious
outcomes following a wide range of infectious risk scenarios
observed during actual acute care. The fact that none of the 52
scenarios was rated has having no likelihood of infectious
outcomes suggests that this group of experts found these IRMs
to be of clinical relevance. The mean ratings for likelihood of
colonization were higher than ratings for likelihood of infec-
tion, except when concerning potential pathogen transfer to
critical patient body sites. Expert ratings varied particularly
according to the source, vector and endpoint involved in the
given scenarios (Figure 2). Although average ratings for like-
lihood of colonization remained relatively constant across the
potential endpoints (range, 2.39–2.88), ratings for likelihood
of infection were higher for scenarios concerning transfer to
patient critical sites (2.51) than to the patient bed (2.08) or
noncritical sites (1.31) (Figure 2). This ﬁnding is logical
because the likelihood of infection is higher when pathogens
are transferred directly to a critical site, where the body’s
ﬁgure 2. The 3 radial charts display the mean expert ratings according to the source (left), vector (middle), and endpoint (right)
involved in the infectious risk moment (IRM) scenarios rated by experts. All scenarios were classiﬁed by source, vector, and endpoint
according to the INFORM taxonomy.10 Ratings for colonization are shown in light grey, and ratings for infection are shown in dark grey.
ﬁgure 3. All infectious risk moments (IRMs) are plotted according to frequency of occurrence (number of IRMs per hour of active
patient care) and expert rating of likelihood of infectious outcomes, colonization (marked in grey) above and infection (marked in black)
below. IRMs are grouped according to the vectors involved.
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natural barrier is already broken (eg, catheter insertion site)
or less resistant (eg, mucous membranes). Furthermore,
although the average rating for likelihood of colonization was
highest for scenarios involving hands as vectors (3.02), the
average rating for likelihood of infection was highest for sce-
narios involving invasive devices (2.51) as vectors. Concerning
the source of pathogens, average ratings for likelihood of
colonization were highest among scenarios where mobile
objects (3.12), gloves (2.98), and medical devices (2.92) were
the sources of pathogens, whereas ratings for likelihood of
infection were highest among scenarios where gloves (2.78),
the patient’s own intact skin (2.59) and the healthcare worker’s
own body or clothing (2.21) were the source of pathogens.
This last ﬁnding is of particular interest, given that the patient’s
own body may be an often-overlooked source of pathogens.
These ﬁndings are best appreciated together with the
structured observations reported in our companion paper
demonstrating that such IRMs occur as frequently as 34.9–56.3
times per active care hour, depending on the care setting.10
Together, these ﬁndings suggest that the cumulative risk of
such IRMs on a system level may indeed present a signiﬁcant
threat to patient safety. The IRM index, which provides a
quantitative indication of relative risk by integrating expert
ratings with the frequency of individual IRMs during acute
patient care,10 shows a marked and relevant variety in system
level infectious risks. The IRM index, for example, demon-
strates that scenarios with the highest expert ratings for
likelihood of infectious outcomes did not necessarily have the
highest corresponding relative risk indices due to their rare
occurrence during actual patient care. Notable examples
include scenarios 2, 6, and 14 (shown to the far right in
Figure 3), which all include potential pathogen transfer via
hands and gloves to patient critical sites, yet occur less than
once per hour, resulting in relatively low risk indices
(Figure 4). In contrast, scenarios with the highest relative risk
indices for colonization (eg, 19 and 12) and infection
(eg, 18 and 12) were those that combined medium expert
ratings of infectious outcomes with high frequency, which
occurred more than twice per hour of patient care.
These ﬁndings exhibit the value of our mixed-method
approach, combining expert ratings with observed frequencies
to provide a holistic view of infectious risks. The human-
factors-informed approach of systematically identifying oppor-
tunities for transmission of pathogens also lies at the center of
other landmark infection prevention strategies, such as the
World Health Organization’s “Five Moments” for Hand
Hygiene.8,15 While the Five Moments model is limited to hands
as the primary vector in the bidirectional exchange of micro-
organisms via contacts with surfaces throughout the healthcare
environment, we extend this argumentation to consider the role
of gloves, HCW clothing and accessories, invasive devices,
medical devices, and mobile objects as vectors.
While others have noted a lack of literature documenting
the risks of microbial transmission associated with HCW
hands during speciﬁc care tasks,8 this applies even more to the
other transmission pathways addressed in our work. Thus, the
Delphi technique was selected in this study to establish expert
consensus considering the limited published evidence, parti-
cularly regarding the risks of patient colonization or infection
associated with speciﬁc behaviors beyond hand hygiene.
Speciﬁcally, using the Delphi methods over several feedback
rounds has the advantage of allowing experts to exchange and
reassess opinions to come to an informed consensus decision.
Finally, we anticipate that the quantitative approach presented
here for identifying speciﬁc behaviors associated with
transmission and subsequent quantiﬁcation of the likelihood
of infectious outcomes may provide a basis for further quanti-
tative modelling of system-level risks.
In the realm of healthcare safety and quality, multiple stra-
tegies have been proposed for prioritizing the behaviors
ﬁgure 4. The risk index for colonization (marked in grey) and infection (marked in black) of each individual infectious risk moment
(IRM). The IRM index is a multiplication of the frequency with which each IRM occurs10 and expert ratings of likelihood of negative
outcomes, colonization or infection, following the IRM.
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addressed by improvement strategies. A critical component of
this prioritization is assessing how likely the addressed beha-
vior is to have a positive or negative impact on patient
outcomes.18,19 Awareness of the frequency with which
infectious risk behaviors occur,10 together with expert
consensus regarding the likelihood of infectious outcomes,
provides a basis for prioritizing the implementation of
interventions that prevent the transmission of pathogens.
Therefore, we introduced the IRM index (Figure 4), which
considers both the likelihood of infectious outcomes at indi-
vidual IRMs, as well as the frequency with which the IRM
occurs during actual care, to provide a quantitative indication
of relative risks on a systems level.
Ambiguity is an important barrier to healthcare worker
adherence to guidelines.20 We suspect that ambiguity regard-
ing likelihood of infectious outcomes following unsafe beha-
viors prevents healthcare workers from developing accurate
risk perceptions.21 Risk perceptions play a central role in
several social cognitive models as a behavioral determi-
nant.22–24 Therefore, we believe that quantifying the risk
associated with speciﬁc behaviors through expert consensus
represents a ﬁrst step towards removing ambiguity for
healthcare workers and towards establishing informed risk
perceptions to support safe behavior.
Some limitations of this study should be considered.
Although 3 Delphi rounds were previously suggested as sufﬁ-
cient for achieving consensus,25 we were unable to achieve
consensus ratings according to our a priori deﬁnition for 12
items (11.5%). Furthermore, despite our efforts to avoid
anchoring or order-effect biases15 through block randomiza-
tion of survey items, the order of blocks remained the same
throughout all surveys. In addition, expert opinions may be
subject to biases that may diverge from actual risks as deter-
mined through microbiology. Yet, given the current absence of
the latter, expert consensus remains the most viable surrogate.
Notably, despite multiple reminders, 5 experts dropped out
during the Delphi process. The ratings of experts who dropped
out were insigniﬁcantly lower during round 1 than experts
who completed the Delphi process (data not shown). It is
unlikely that this factor signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced our study
ﬁndings, but it should be taken into consideration when
interpreting the results. Considering that all IRM scenarios
examined were rated as having at least some likelihood of
infectious outcome, our ﬁndings strongly support the argu-
ment to conduct more extensive microbiological studies
exploring the actual transmission of microorganisms during
patient care activities. Such studies should also further advance
the exploration into how frequently infectious outcomes can
be attributed to speciﬁc behaviors.7,26,27
In conclusion, we believe that these ﬁndings will contribute
to reducing ambiguity regarding the infectious risks associated
with common clinical tasks and thus to supporting safe
behavior. We further hope that establishing a comprehensive
inventory of moments potentially associated with infectious
outcomes, together with expert evaluations of clinical
relevance, will serve the community of researchers and prac-
titioners as a basis for prioritizing future research, training, and
quality improvement initiatives.
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